MARKET FAILURE AND COMMUNITY INVESTMENT:
A MARKET-ORIENTED ALTERNATIVE TO THE
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ACT
MICHAEL KLAUSNERt

The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) is a model of
ambiguity. In a roundabout way, it directs banks to meet "the credit
needs of [their] entire communit[ies], including low- and moderateincome neighborhoods,

consistent with ...

safe and sound

operation."1 In enacting the CRA and making specific reference to
low- and moderate-income communities, Congress presumably
sought to have banks do something that market forces would not
lead them to do, but exactly what is unclear. Did Congress intend
to implement an ill defined "localist" or "communitarian" ideology
by limiting the geographic scope of their lending? Did it intend to
redress discrimination against ethnic and racial groups that reside
disproportionately in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods?
Did it intend to redistribute wealth from bank shareholders to
residents of targeted communities? Or, did it intend, on efficiency
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Lily Kahng, Martin Lowy, Geoffrey Miller, Leonard Nakamura, Eric Posner, Michael
Schill, Richard CohenJay Halbert, and participants in NYU Law School's Brownbag
Workshop for helpful comments on an earlier draft. In addition, I would like to
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1 12 U.S.C. § 2 0 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). The Act applies to "regulated financial
institution[s]," 12 U.S.C. § 2902(2), which are defined to include insured national
banks, state banks, and savings associations, see 12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)-(c). For
simplicity, I will use the term "bank" to refer to all covered financial institutions. The
CRA's mandate is indirect in that it only directs the bank regulators to take a bank's
community service into account when they rule on applications for merger or expansion. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902(3), 2903(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
The CRA refers to "low- and moderate-income neighborhoods." 12 U.S.C.
§ 2903(a)(1). For simplicity, I will use the term "low-income neighborhood" to refer
to all neighborhoods covered by the CRA. Recently issued regulations, see
Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995) (to be codified
in scattered sections of 12 C.F.R.) (joint rules) [hereinafter Final Regulations], define
"low-income" as less than 50% of the median family income in an area, and
"moderate-income" as between 50% and 80% of the median family income in an area.
See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.12(n)(1)-(2)).
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grounds, to remedy market imperfections?

wholly unclear.

2

Congress's intent is

In debating the wisdom of the CRA, most commentators have

paid little, if any, attention to the justification for regulatory
intervention in low-income community credit markets. Community
advocates call for more intervention and more loans.' Critics,
emphasizing the cost of the CRA to banks as well as incidental social
costs, argue against government intervention.4 To the extent that
2 In this issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Professor Overby
describes the CRA as "the product of largely unreflective congressional debate as to
the Act's purpose." A. Brooke Overby, The Community Reinvestment Act Reconsidered,
143 U. PA. L. REV. 1431, 1439 (1995). In describing the Act's legislative history, she
documents "deep-seated division over the Act as well as uncertainty over what the Act

is intended to accomplish-and why." Id. at 1445. Two economists at the Federal
Reserve Bank of San Francisco have stated that "[t]he language of the CRA statute
was intentionally vague, balancing a social policy goal of encouraging banks to lend
in lower income areas with regulators' concerns about bank safety and soundness."
Jonathan A. Neuberger & Ronald H. Schmidt, A Market-BasedApproach to CRA, FRBSF
WKLY. LETTER (Federal Reserve Bank of S.F.), May 27, 1994, at 1, 1.
Overby identifies the term "community" as the CRA's principal source of
ambiguity. See Overby, supra, at 1437. There are other substantial ambiguities as
well. The concept of"credit need" is ambiguous. Is credit need limited to situations
in which a borrower can afford to pay a risk-adjusted interest rate, or would a
borrower have a cognizable credit need even if it could only afford a rate that did not
reflect its risk of default? The constraint imposed by the clause "consistent with...
safe and sound operation," 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1), is also ambiguous. Does this mean
that a bank should not make a loan above some threshold of riskiness? Does it mean
that the bank should make such a loan but should also charge a compensating risk
premium? Or does it mean that the bank should simply retain earnings and thereby
maintain a level of capital that holds its risk of failure constant while it engages in
risky or nonremunerative lending to borrowers in its community? Finally, what if a
bank can find low-risk lending opportunities in its community but only at high search
and monitoring costs? Would the safety and soundness constraint allow the bank to
neglect such opportunities? Congress declined to address these issues when it
enacted the CRA, and neither the regulators nor the courts have resolved them since
then.
' This demand runs throughout the comments of community advocates at
hearings held by the federal bank regulators during 1993. See, e.g., Board of
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Public Meeting Regarding Ideas on CRA Reform,
Sept. 22, 1993 (transcript on file with author).
'Jonathan Macey and Geoffrey Miller have written the most comprehensive
critique of the CRA in which they catalogue the program's social costs. SeeJonathan
R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Community Reinvestment Act: An EconomicAnalysis,
79 VA. L. REv. 291 (1993). Lawrence White has also written a critique in which he
emphasizes the inability of banks to provide CRA-induced services in the long run if
they are making no more than a competitive return on their other businesses. See
Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the
Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281 (1993). White, however, does recognize
the possibility that neighborhood externalities mightjustify government intervention.
See id. at 284-85; infra part I.C.
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commentators identify justifications more refined than more money
for low-income neighborhoods or lower costs to banks, they refer to
5
different justifications and largely fail to join issue.
In this symposium issue of the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, Professor Overby attempts to place some structure on this
unwieldy debate by focusing on the ends and means of the CRA.
She argues that the CRA was intended to be, and can be justified as,
an antidiscrimination law-an adjunct to the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, which prohibits discrimination in lending on the basis of
"race, color, religion, national origin, sex or marital status, or age." 6
In support of this reading of congressional intent, she relies on
statements in the legislative history regarding "redlining," and in
support of her normative view, she invokes an equality argument.7
Overby concludes that an antidiscrimination objective requires
an efforts-based enforcement regime rather than a results-based
regime. She argues that banks should be required to search for
lending opportunities in their local communities but that they
should not be required to lend there if, after searching, they choose
not to. Imposing an outreach and search obligation on banks, she
contends, would create equality of access to credit at the least cost
to banks. Requiring a bank to make loans, on the other hand, she
argues, would compromise the bank's financial safety and sound8
ness.
The CRA, however, is poorly suited to the task of combatting
discrimination. It applies to residents of low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods without regard to race or ethnicity, and even without
regard to their individual incomes.9 Moreover, the Equal Credit

' For example, although Macey and Miller focus primarily on the social costs of
the CRA, they describe the Act as grounded in an "ideology of localism" that fails to
recognize the nationalization and globalization of financial markets. See Macey &
Miller, supra note 4, at 303-12. Professor Anthony Taibi, on the other hand, imagines
a world of community economic empowerment that somehow sidesteps these
markets. See Anthony D. Taibi, Banking, Finance,and Community Economic Empowerment: StructuralEconomic Theory, ProceduralCivil Rights, andSubstantive RacialJustice,
107 HARV. L. REv. 1465, 1536-40 (1994). Peter Swire describes the debate as
comprising those who "wish to ensure greater devotion of resources to low-income
and moderate-income communities" (implicitly attributing to them wealth redistribution arguments) and "those who oppose government regulation of market decisions"
(implicitly attributing to them efficiency arguments). Peter P. Swire, Safe Harborsand
a Proposal to Improve the Community Reinvestment Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 349, 351 (1993).
6 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1) (1988).

7 See Overby, supra note 2, at 1497-1505.
8

See id. at 1508.

9 The

term "redlining" originally referred to the reported practice of banks
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Opportunity Act specifically addresses lending discrimination.
Finally, as discussed in Part I, there are at least theoretical reasons
to believe that CRA-targeted neighborhoods may be systematically
denied access to credit for reasons unrelated to racial or ethnic
discrimination.
As for efforts-oriented versus results-oriented enforcement of
the CRA, both modes of enforcement impose costs on banks.
Whether one imposes higher costs than the other depends on how
much effort is required, what amount of lending is required, and
how much record keeping is necessary for a bank to prove compliance. A major criticism of current CRA regulations is that their
efforts-based orientation leads to too much paperwork. This has
engendered in many banks a willingness, in principle, to accept a
results-based regime.10
In the discussion below, I analyze whether there may be an
efficiency-based justification for intervening in low-income community credit markets, and whether, as some have suggested, the CRA
can be justified on efficiency grounds."
I begin by describing
market imperfections that may leave low-income neighborhoods
with suboptimally low levels of credit. I then analyze whether the
CRA promotes efficiency by' responding effectively to those
imperfections, and I conclude that it does not. Finally, I propose a

drawing lines around certain areas on a map and declining to make loans within those
areas. The term, however, has different meanings to different people, and it is
difficult to infer any particular meaning from its use in the congressional debates.
See ROLAND E. BRANDEL & DAVID E. TEITELBAUM, THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
ACT: POLICIES AND COMPLIANCE § 1.01[c] (1991) ("The term 'redlining' meant

different things to those who used it in 1977, referring in a variety of contexts to a
variety of practices and results."); Macey & Miller, supra note 4, at 298-99; Overby,
supra note 2, at 1446-53. Note, however, that the 1991 amendments to the CRA do
allow bank regulators to award CRA credit for donations to banks owned by women
and members of certain specified racial and ethnic minority groups. See 12 U.S.C.
§ 2907 (Supp. V 1993).
10 See Macey & Miller, supra note 4, at 325-26; Overby, supra note 2, at 1468.
n These suggestions that the CRA may respond to market failures have been
made casually, typically after analyzing the presence of market failures in depth. See,
e.g., JACK M. GUTTENTAG & SUSAN M. WACHTER, REDLINING AND PUBLIC POLICY 39

(1980) (noting that the CRA may address neighborhood externalities); William C.
Gruben et al., Imperfect Information and the Community Reinvestment Act, ECON. REV.
(Federal Reserve Bank of S.F.), Summer 1990, at 27,39-41 (noting that the CRA may
respond to information asymmetries); Leonard I. Nakamura, InformationExternalities:
Why Lending May Sometimes Need a Jump Start, Bus. REV. (Federal Reserve Bank of
Phila.), Jan.-Feb. 1993, at 3, 7 (noting that the CRA may respond to information
externalities).
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system of "tradable obligations" as a potentially more effective
12
alternative to the current CRA regime.
I. MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AFFECTING LOW-INCOME
NEIGHBORHOOD CREDIT MARKETS

Several economists have examined the possibility that market
imperfections may result in a suboptimally low volume of credit
reaching low-income neighborhoods.
Some have referred to
lending patterns created by such market imperfections as "rational
redlining." 3 This Part examines these market imperfections.
A. Information Costs
For a bank to make a loan to a borrower, the bank needs
information regarding the likelihood that the borrower will default.
Acquisition of that information, however, entails costs. Whether a
bank will incur those costs and evaluate the creditworthiness of a
particular borrower depends on the magnitude of the costs
compared to the expected return from the loan. If the costs are
higher than the expected return, the bank will forego consideration
of the loan altogether.
The information costs of lending are compounded by an
asymmetry of information between banks and borrowers.
In
general, a borrower knows more about his own risk of default than

'2Before moving on, a disclaimer is in order. The questions I address are narrow:
First, if significant market imperfections are present in low-income neighborhoods,
is the CRA an appropriate response? And second, is the tradable obligation system
that I propose a better response? I make no empirical claim regarding the impact of
these market imperfections, although I find it plausible that their impact is significant.
Moreover, further study would be needed to assess the social cost of implementing
my proposal compared to the social cost of the current CRA system or the social cost
of nonintervention. At this point, I argue only that my proposal warrants consideration because it potentially offers a better response to these market imperfections
than does the CRA as currently implemented. Furthermore, I take as a starting point
the apparent political reality that banks are going to bear the cost of intervening in
low-income neighborhood credit markets. I make no judgment regarding whether
they, as opposed to society at large or any other constituency, should bear this cost.
is See, e.g., GUTTENTAC & WACHTER, supra note 11, at 7-8, 11-12; William W. Lang
& Leonard I. Nakamura, A Model of Redlining,33J. URB. ECON. 223,224 (1993). The
term "irrational redlining" is sometimes used to refer to redlining based on racial or
ethnic prejudice. See GuITTENTAG & WACHTER, supra note 11, at 13-14. Somewhere
in between rational and irrational redlining is the situation in which banks with no
racial or ethnic prejudice avoid lending to a neighborhood merely because of the
absence of lending by other banks, whose policies have been motivated by racial or
ethnic prejudice and which have caused the neighborhood to deteriorate.
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does the bank to which he applies for a loan. As I will discuss in

subsection 1, this asymmetry compounds the problem of information costs and can lead lenders to decline to serve entire low-income

neighborhoods.
Information costs of lending are mitigated to some degree by
positive information externalities that flow from one loan transaction to another. In the process of granting a loan, a bank produces
information that can be used to facilitate future lending. For
instance, in the case of a home loan, a bank's willingness to make
a loan following an appraisal of the mortgaged property constitutes
valuable information regarding the value of comparable houses.
This information can reduce the cost of financing the sale of those
comparable homes by increasing the accuracy with which lenders
can appraise those properties. If sales slow down in a neighborhood, however, this information becomes less available, and the
information cost of lending can rise. As I will discuss in subsection
2, this possibility is of particular concern in low-income neighborhoods.
1.

Asymmetric Information and Credit Rationing

Asymmetric information is inherent in credit relationships. Not
only do borrowers often know more about their own risk of default
than do lenders, they can increase their riskiness after a loan has
been made. This asymmetry can lead to "credit rationing," a
situation in which a lender declines to lend to a group of borrowers
that, on average, pose a high risk of default, even if some members
14
of the group are not as risky as others.
In this scenario, lenders decline to lend to some groups of
borrowers at any interest rate. The underlying dynamic is that, as
a bank raises the rate it charges a particular group of borrowers, the
composition of the pool of potential borrowers within the group can
be expected to shift toward riskier members. 5 At some point, the

14 Groups

of borrowers are differentiated from one another by qualities that the

lender can observe-for instance, age, occupation, or neighborhood. Asymmetry of
information exists with respect to qualities that differentiate potential borrowers
within "observationally distinguishable" groups. Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss,

Credit Rationing in Markets with Impeafect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 406
(1981).
" Adverse selection and moral hazard are the underlying phenomena explaining
this shift. The borrowers who know they are relatively unlikely to repay a loan will
be less deterred from borrowing by a high interest rate than others. See id. at 395401. In addition, borrowers that accept loans at high rates will have a greater
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increased expected return attributable to a higher rate is offset by
the increase in expected defaults attributable to the riskier composition of the borrower pool. At that point, if the bank were to
increase the interest rate it charges the group, it would actually
reduce its expected return. 6 To the extent that borrowers in lowincome neighborhoods are on average relatively risky, this dynamic
may result in these neighborhoods being rationed out of the credit
market. 7
The credit-rationing scenario described above assumes, perhaps
unrealistically, that a lender cannot distinguish between low- and
high-risk borrowers in a low-income neighborhood. It assumes away
the possibility that a lender can acquire information that allows it
to identify the relatively low-risk borrowers, to restrain them from
increasing their riskiness once a loan is made, and to offer them
interest rates commensurate with their individual risks of default.
In a related model, this assumption is relaxed, and banks are
assumed to be capable of acquiring information regarding the
default risk of individual borrowers. Acquisition of this information, however, is assumed, realistically, to entail costs. In this
model, not surprisingly, the extent to which a lender lends to
groups that, on average, pose a high risk of default depends on the
cost and value of information regarding such a group. The lower
the cost and the greater the benefit of acquiring information about
borrowers in the high-risk group, the more lending there will be to
8
members of the group.'
This model also suggests that banks may rationally decline to
lend in low-income neighborhoods, where the cost to a bank of
acquiring credit-related information may well be high and the

incentive than borrowers at lower rates to increase their risk of default. See id. at 401-

02.

16 Expected return refers to the amount of money the borrower is obligated to
repay discounted to take into account the possibility of default. See id. at 393-94.
"' For more detailed discussions of this dynamic, see David Jaffee & Joseph
Stiglitz, Credit Rationing, in 2 HANDBOOK OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 839, 853-60
(Benjamin M. Friedman & Frank H. Hahn eds., 1990). See generally Stiglitz & Weiss,

supra note 14.
There may be political and legal constraints as well that deter a bank from
charging a higher rate to riskier borrowers. SeeJohn V. Duca & Stuart S. Rosenthal,
Do Mortgage Rates Va7y Based on Household Default Characteristics? Evidence on Rate
Sorting and Credit Rationing, 8 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 99, 100-02 (1994) (citing
antidiscrimination laws, community pressure, and "bad press" as examples of
constraints on the interest rates banks may charge).
18See Gruben et al., supra note 11, at 34-35.
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benefit low. Credit analysis involves substantial fixed costs in
initially assessing and then monitoring the economic conditions of
a neighborhood and its surrounding area and in becoming familiar
and maintaining familiarity with the neighborhood's businesses and
residents. Moreover, there are significant fixed costs involved in
evaluating an individual loan application and monitoring the
riskiness of an individual borrower. 9 This is true for all lending.
In a low-income neighborhood, however, the cost of lending is
higher than that of lending in other neighborhoods. Potential
borrowers are less likely to have had prior borrowing experience
and are more likely to need special help both in applying for a loan
and in repaying it. Outreach efforts are needed to get borrowers to
make applications, and education is needed to facilitate compliance
with the terms of a loan. Furthermore, information regarding the
creditworthiness of low-income neighborhood residents may be
relatively difficult to obtain, and the qualifications of even creditthe standards that
worthy borrowers will often not conform with
20
banks employ in other parts of their business.
Moreover, the revenues over which the fixed costs of lending are
spread are likely to be low in low-income neighborhoods relative to
higher-income neighborhoods. First, there will be relatively few
creditworthy borrowers; and second, loans in low-income neighborhoods tend to be relatively small.2 ' Consequently, the relatively
high cost of lending in a low-income neighborhood will be spread
over a relatively small return.
In sum, these economic models suggest that the costs and
benefits of acquiring information regarding lending opportunities
in a low-income neighborhood may lead a bank rationally to
conclude that it should do business elsewhere. This theoretical
prediction is consistent with bankers' reports that they prefer to
rather than
deny loans to borrowers they perceive as high-risk,
22
rate.
interest
higher
substantially
a
charging them

19See BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT LENDING BY DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 7-8 (1993)
[hereinafter FED REPORT].
20 Experts in community development commonly cite these differences from
mainstream lending. See id. at 3, 8, 34, 36, 54; JULIA A. PARZEN & MICHAEL H.
KIESCHNICK, CREDIT WHERE IT'S DUE 143-48, 173-78 (1992) (describing riskmanagement efforts and lending costs of community development banks).
21 See FED REPORT, supra note 19, at 8-9, 21, 34.
2 See id. at 34.
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2. Information Externalities
To economize on information costs, banks rely on information
generated by past lending--both their own lending and that of other
lenders. In the case of home mortgage loans, banks rely heavily on
appraisals, which in turn rely on past sales of comparable homes in
a neighborhood. Those past sales occurred only because financing
was available to earlier buyers, and their purchases were made
possible by appraisals that relied on yet earlier sales. The home
loan market thus depends on a continuous sequence of sales, which
inform appraisals, which in turn facilitate additional sales. A loan
thus creates a positive externality to future lenders and borrowers
in the form of valuable information.
If, for any reason, the rate of home sales decreases in a
neighborhood, this positive externality would decline as well. Fewer
comparable properties will be available to appraisers, which would
result in less accurate appraisals. In some cases, an appraisal will be
lower than the amount the buyer has already agreed to pay the
seller, and the bank will reduce the amount it is willing to lend. In
other cases, the appraised value will equal the sale price, but the
bank will nonetheless realize that the appraisal is based on weak
comparisons and will reduce the amount it is willing to lend.2 3 In
either case, the sale will fall through unless the buyer agrees to
make a larger down payment or the seller agrees to reduce the sale
price. To the extent that neither occurs, houses remain on the
market, or sellers rent their houses rather than sell them. As a
consequence, less information is available to facilitate future sales,
and the pace of sales in the neighborhood declines even more.
24
Once begun, this dynamic can be self-perpetuating.
This declining spiral can occur regardless of the fundamental
value of homes in a neighborhood or the economic vitality of an
area. It occurs because of the inability of lenders to discern the
value of properties.
The effect is to compound what would
otherwise be a transient decline in turnover into a protracted period
of illiquidity and a real decline in home values. As homes remain
unsold, would-be sellers may defer upkeep, and physical deteriora-

' An appraisal would be uncertain under these circumstances because it is based
on sales that occurred too early or that were geographically distant from the property
being appraised.
24 This dynamic is modeled in Lang & Nakamura, supra note 13, at 225-29. It is
also described in Nakamura, supra note 11, at 3.
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tion may occur, which, in turn, would reduce their economic value
further.
A similar dynamic can occur in commercial lending. Although
appraisals are not necessarily involved, lenders rely on other
information generated by past lending. Consultants to banks
compile this information, and banks use it to analyze local economic
25
conditions, industry trends, and the condition of individual firms.
In addition, by monitoring a business to which it has a loan outstanding, a bank acquires information regarding current business
conditions. Such information can reduce that bank's cost of making
a new loan to that borrower and possibly to other borrowers as well.
If economic activity and hence lending in an area declines, however,
this positive information externality declines as well. Consequently,
the availability of credit can diminish, and the decline can be longer
lasting and deeper than fundamental economic forces would
26
dictate.
Low-income areas are especially vulnerable to this dynamic. As
explained above, home buyers can counteract its effects by increasing their down payments. Similarly, businesses may be able to rely
on internal funds during periods of illiquidity. But in low-income
areas, home buyers and businesses are less likely than their
counterparts elsewhere to have such funds available. As a result,
this phenomenon, which is present in all credit markets, can be
especially severe in low-income neighborhoods.
B. Neighborhood Externalities

A second market imperfection that may infect low-income
neighborhood credit markets stems from the negative externality
associated with the physical deterioration of a neighborhood. The
deterioration of a home, store front, or other property can reduce
the value of neighboring properties, and on a broad scale, physical
deterioration can impair property values in an entire neighborhood.
As a result, a lender may decline to lend in a neighborhood that it
perceives to be in decline, even if the property offered as collateral
provides sufficient security at the time a loan application is made,
25 For example, Robert Morris Associates, an association of bank loan officers,
collects and publishes data that banks use in making credit decisions.
216See William W. Lang & Leonard I. Nakamura, Information Losses in a Dynamic

Model of Credit, 44J. FIN. 731, 744 (1989); Nakamura, supra note 11, at 10-13.
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and even if the lender is confident that the borrower will maintain
that property.
Furthermore, bank lending decisions can produce neighborhood
externalities, especially in low-income neighborhoods, where
property owners are relatively unlikely to have internal or personal
funds. Under these circumstances, the withholding of a loan can
create negative externalities. If credit is unavailable, properties for
sale may remain unsold, and possibly unoccupied, because would-be
buyers cannot get financing. Owners, in the meantime, may neglect
maintenance. In addition, owners who want to rehabilitate their
properties may be unable to do so because they cannot borrow the
money needed. Thus, a lack of credit in a neighborhood can
actually precipitate its decline, or prevent its rehabilitation.
Conversely, the making of a loan can create positive neighborhood
externalities. Because banks cannot ordinarily be expected to take
these positive externalities into account, lending in low-income
27
neighborhoods would be expected to be suboptimally low.
C. InteractionAmong Market Imperfections
Each of these market imperfections can leave creditworthy
borrowers in low-income neighborhoods without access to credit or
with less access than they would have if markets worked perfectly.
In combination, these imperfections can compound one another.
Consider a neighborhood in which the volume of home sales
declines precipitously for exogenous reasons. Perhaps a large
employer has left the area, near-term employment prospects are
dim, and sellers are initially not willing to drop the asking prices for
their homes. If the area were otherwise healthy, one might expect
new firms eventually to enter, employment prospects to brighten,
and home values to return to their prior levels. During the interim,
however, home sales slow down. As a result, information regarding
the value of homes becomes difficult to obtain, appraisals are less
accurate, and sales volume declines further. Residents may move
before they sell their houses, and upkeep may lapse. Over time, the
neighborhood may begin to deteriorate physically, and neighborhood externalities may further propel a downward spiral. At some
point, banks that had previously made loans in the neighborhood
27 For a discussion of neighborhood externalities, see GUTTENTAG & WACHTER,
supra note 11, at 7-9, 11-12; FED REPORT, supra note 19, at 9 (recommending
collaboration among lenders to overcome information externalities).
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based on the underlying health of the local economy may decide
that it is no longer worthwhile to invest in distinguishing good from
bad credit risks, and they may withdraw credit from the neighborhood entirely. Moreover, the new employer that would otherwise
have materialized may not appear, either because it cannot get
financing or because the neighborhood is already too dilapidated.
D. Objectives of Government Intervention
The discussion up to this point suggests that, to the extent that
efficiency is a goal of government intervention in low-incomeneighborhood credit markets, two intermediate objectives would be
appropriate: first, a reduction in the cost of information, and
second, the internalization of positive information externalities and
neighborhood externalities created by lending.
A reduction in information costs would represent a clear
increase in social wealth. If the cost of the lending in these
neighborhoods were to decline, banks would be able to make more
profitable loans. Both banks and borrowers in low-income neighborhoods would be better off.
The efficiency to be achieved by internalizing positive neighborhood and information externalities is less straightforward but
nonetheless evident. If a bank is able to internalize the positive
externalities created by its own lending, that bank will voluntarily
make more loans to low-income neighborhoods. As a result, social
wealth would be enhanced; the bank and its borrowers would be
better off. This same increase in social wealth might be achieved,
however, at least in theory, by forcing banks through regulation to
make the same loans that they would make if externalities were
internalized. The relative efficiency of forced lending, on the one
hand, and voluntary lending spurred by internalizing externalities,
on the other, would depend on the administrative cost and the
effectiveness of each type of intervention. As discussed in Part II,
the CRA largely takes the former approach, and it has been severely
criticized by banks for imposing high costs on them and by
community advocates for producing too little lending in low-income
neighborhoods. Part III proposes a form of intervention that takes
the latter approach and that is potentially more efficient than the
current CRA.
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II. THE CRA AS A RESPONSE TO MARKET IMPERFECTIONS
The CRA directs every bank to "[meet] the credit needs of its
community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods." 2 To enforce this obligation, it requires the federal bank
regulators to assign each bank a CRA rating of either "outstanding,"
"satisfactory," "needs to improve," or "substantial noncompliance."2 9' These ratings are based substantially on a bank's record
of lending in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods within the
area in which the bank operates. Although no direct sanction is
applied to banks with low CRA ratings, the regulators are required
to take these ratings into account when a bank or its holding
company applies to charter a new bank, to open a new branch, to
relocate, or to merge with or acquire another bank."0
The federal bank regulators have recently issued lengthy
regulations designed to revamp CRA enforcement "to emphasize
performance rather than process."3 The central feature of these
regulations is a "lending test," which evaluates the volume and
dispersion of a bank's lending in low-income neighborhoods within
its area of operation.3 2 These regulations replace regulations
issued in 1977, which consisted of broad standards that emphasized
a bank's efforts to make loans in low-income neighborhoods, as

28 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
- 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(2) (Supp. V 1993).
so See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902(3), 2903(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Regulations
provide for consideration in response to other applications as well. See Final
Regulations, supra note 1 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.29).
s See Final Regulations, supra note 1.
12 The lending test, which is the most important of three tests in determining a
bank's CRA rating, "evaluates a bank's record of helping to meet the credit needs of
its assessment area(s) through its lending activities." Final Regulations, supra note 1
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(a)). To obtain a grade of "outstanding" on this
test, a bank must have "[a]n excellent record of serving the credit needs of highly
economically disadvantaged areas." In addition, it must have "[a]n excellent
distribution... of loans among individuals of different income levels," and "[a]n
excellent distribution of loans in its assessment area(s)." For a grade of "high
satisfactory," the regulations substitute the adjective "good" for "excellent," and for
a "low satisfactory" grade, the term "adequate" is used. Id. (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. pt. 228, app. A, § (b)(1)). A bank's "assessment area" is roughly the one or
more Metropolitan Statistical Areas that account for substantial portions of a bank's
deposit-taking or lending. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.41). In applying
these lending performance criteria, examiners are directed to take into account a
wide range of factors intended to reflect a bank's opportunities to make profitable
loans. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.21(b), (d)).
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opposed to the loans it actually made."3 Both the old regulations
and the new regulations are similar, however, in that they direct
banks to serve geographically dispersed low-income neighborhoods
34
within their areas of operation.
As discussed below, the GRA's requirement of dispersed service
impedes banks from economizing on information costs and from
internalizing information and neighborhood externalities. The
heart of the problem is that this requirement hampers both
specialization and coordination.
A. The CRA and Information Costs
By requiring banks to lend in low-income neighborhoods
throughout the areas in which they do business, the CRA fails to
promote information efficiencies. This is true for two reasons.
First, the CRA leads banks to incur redundant costs in seeking
creditworthy borrowers in low-income neighborhoods. As discussed
above, lending in low-income neighborhoods entails relatively high
fixed costs and relatively low revenues.35 Consequently, if too
many banks attempt to lend in a single neighborhood, the aggregate
cost of lending in that neighborhood will be suboptimally high-too
many banks will chase too few loans. The CRA, in effect, directs all
banks in an area to serve all low-income neighborhoods in the area.
There is no reason, however, to expect lending opportunities in an
area's low-income neighborhoods to support efficient lending by all
of the surrounding area's banks. In fact, the economics of lending
in these neighborhoods suggests that a much smaller number of
banks would be optimal in any single neighborhood. In other
markets, overcrowding leads the least efficient firms to exit until the
most efficient firms remain. The CRA, however, does not allow this
to occur in low-income neighborhood credit markets. Consequently, although it promotes lending, it does so at a higher-than-optimal
aggregate cost.
Second, the CRA impedes individual banks from economizing
on information costs because it deters specialization. A bank might
find it efficient to concentrate its lending efforts in a particular
ss See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 228 (1994) (Federal Reserve CRA regulations).

' Although the preamble to the recently issued regulations explains that a bank
is not expected to lend evenly in every census tract within its assessment area, it also
explains that the geographical dispersion of a bank's loans is a major factor in
determining its CRA rating. See Final Regulations, supra note 1.
3- See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
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neighborhood or community. To do so, its employees would get to
know the people, businesses, culture, and economy of the neighborhood. If residents of the neighborhood speak a foreign language,
the bank would hire employees that speak that language and
provide forms, instructions, and other documentation in that
language. If a community has developed credit practices, such as
the keh in Korean communities,"6 the bank might develop financial
products that make use of those practices. A mainstream bank
could attempt to specialize in this way, or a bank might emerge
from within a community and be owned and managed by community members. Either way, by being immersed in the life of a
neighborhood, the bank could make individualized assessments of
creditworthiness, rather than generic assessments that result in
37
credit rationing.
By requiring geographically dispersed lending, however, the
CRA deters this type of specialization. A bank that concentrates on
too few neighborhoods risks receiving a low CRA rating. Banks that
have attempted to specialize in serving particular ethnic neighborhoods, for example, have run afoul of the CRA.3 8 Moreover, the
CRA further deters specialization by reducing the volume of lending
a specialist bank can expect to do in a given neighborhood. A bank
that specializes would have to compete with banks driven into its
market by the CRA. Even if those banks are less efficient than the
specialist, they will take some of the specialist's business in order to
satisfy their GRA examiners."9 Because the specialization entails
6

See, e.g., Elyssa Getreu, Taking a Lesson from Koreafor Lending in the Inner City,
AM. BANKER, June 29, 1992, at 7 (describing kehs, a type of lending club in which
members make monthly contributions to a pool that will eventually be awarded as a
loan to the member possessing the best idea for a new business venture).
" Successful community-based lenders (which commonly are not banks and
therefore not subject to the CRA or which, if they are banks, conduct operations
highly focused on low-income neighborhoods) have taken this approach. See, e.g.,
PARZEN & KIESCHNICK, supra note 20, at 51 (stating that successful community lenders
specialize);James B. Arndorfer, 'Hip-HopCredit Union'HasHigh Hopes, AM. BANKER,
Feb. 6, 1995, at 10 (describing how Central Brooklyn Federal Credit Union developed
expertise in Bedford-Stuyvesant); Ronald Grzywinski, The New Old-FashionedBanking,
HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1991, at 87, 89-97 (describing ways in which South Shore
Bank developed specialized knowledge of South Shore); Penny Lunt, How Seven Banks
Serve Low-Income Markets, ABA BANKINCJ., Sept. 1992, at 57, 57-66 (describing ways

in which several banks have developed neighborhood-specific expertise).
38 See, e.g., KENNETH H. THOMAS, COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT PERFORMANCE 17475, 203 (1993) (noting that targeting ethnic groups yields low CRA ratings); Terrence
O'Hara, Calif's Asian Banks Feel the Sting of CRA, AM. BANKER, Dec. 21, 1993, at 6
(same).
" This effect of the CRA is reflected in the stories of some minority banks. See
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substantial fixed costs, this loss of potential volume reduces the
°
returns to specialization.
B. The CRA and the Internalizationof Externalities
The CRA also fails to promote the internalization of information
and neighborhood externalities. In part, this failure is due to the
impediments to specialization described above. If banks were
allowed to specialize in lending to particular neighborhoods, a
relatively small number of banks would serve each low-income
neighborhood. This concentration would promote the internalization of these externalities. As an illustration, assume that only one
bank served a given neighborhood and that it reaped benefits from
the positive information and neighborhood externalities created by
its own lending. Under these circumstances, the prospect of gaining
these valuable externalities would serve as an inducement to lend.
Even if the direct return that the bank expected from a loan would
not justify making it, the value of these externalities would tip the
balance at the margin in favor of making the loan. As a result,
more loans would be made, and both the bank and the borrowers
would be better off. Moreover, the neighborhood would be less
vulnerable to spirals of illiquidity and deterioration.
The fewer the banks serving a neighborhood, the more each
bank can expect to internalize information and neighborhood
externalities and the less vulnerable the neighborhood will be.4"
By forcing many banks into each low-income neighborhood, the
GRA fails to allow any single bank to expect to internalize these
externalities.

e.g., Nanine Alexander, Tough CRA Rules HurtingMinority Banks, U.S. BANKER, Sept.
1991, at 70, 70 (describing the concern of many specialized lending institutions that
they will lose customers to mainstream lending institutions entering their markets in
response to a strengthened CRA). With high fixed cost, the profitability of a business
depends heavily on its volume.
40 Critics of this proposal may question my claim that the CRA drives banks into
too many low-income neighborhoods. They would point out that the volume of
lending in low-income neighborhoods is not very high. My point, however, is that if
banks could specialize, they would lend more in these neighborhoods; but they cannot
specialize, and that leads them to be more resistant to the CRA.
,' Lang and Nakamura show that, under these circumstances, lending by a
monopolist might be more efficient from a societal point of view than lending in a
more competitive market. See Lang & Nakamura, supra note 26, at 739-40.
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In addition to concentration, coordination among banks offers
a means of internalizing externalities.42 By coordinating their
lending, a group of banks can internalize positive neighborhood
externalities. As long as the group can distribute these benefits
among members so that each is better off, there will be incentives
to coordinate. Coordination, however, entails costs. There are
costs in communicating and achieving consensus, and there is
uncertainty regarding the commitment and reliability of other
banks. Furthermore, in order to internalize neighborhood externalities within a group of banks, the group's share of loans made in
a neighborhood must be large.
The CRA does little to promote coordination. Banks are given
only limited credit for lending through consortia, a primary
mechanism of coordination." In addition, by requiring all banks
to serve low-income neighborhoods, the CRA makes coordination
difficult. In order to capture a large portion of neighborhood
externalities, a coordinating group would have to be large. Large
groups, however, have difficulty coordinating. Shirking is more
difficult to detect, and the gains from coordination are more
difficult to divide."
42 Concentration and coordination of course raise antitrust concerns as well.

These concerns would be limited by the potential entry of lenders not currently in a
neighborhood. Further analysis of this concern, however, lies beyond the scope of
this discussion.
4s In a typical consortium, banks contribute funds from which loans are made, and
each bank holds a pro rata share of the pool of loans made. Participation in a
consortium, however, offers only partial credit under the lending test. See Final
Regulations, supra note 1 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.22(a), (d)). The preamble
states that direct lending is an "essential element" of the test. See id. For a
description of consortia, see COMMUNITY AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEP'T, FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF PHILA., COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ADVOCATES 43-56 (Keith
Rolland ed., 1993) [hereinafter COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT ADVOCATES].
" One unique example of coordination is telling, both because it illustrates the
value of coordination and because it has not been replicated. The example is the
Delaware Valley Mortgage Plan (DVMP). Under the DVMP, eight member banks
make home loans directly to residents of low-income neighborhoods, but they
cooperate by agreeing to apply flexible underwriting standards, by sharing
information, and by sharing the cost of community outreach and education programs.
To enforce their agreement and to enhance the likelihood that loans to creditworthy
borrowers will be granted, a committee of representatives from member banks
reviews rejected loan applications and can recommend that a bank reconsider a
rejected application or that another member consider it. See Paul S. Calem, The
Delaware Valley MortgagePlan: Extending the Reach of Mortgage Lenders, 4J. HOUSING
RES. 337, 337-42 (1993) (describing the formation, goals, and operating procedures
of the DVMP).
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C. South Shore Bank: An Illustration
The experience of South Shore Bank in Chicago illustrates how
a bank that specializes in low-income neighborhood lending can
successfully economize on information costs and internalize externalities. Since 1973, South Shore Bank has specialized in serving
the low-income neighborhood of South Shore. In the words of
Ronald Grzywinski, Chairman of Shorebank Corporation, the bank's
holding company, South Shore had suffered a "spiral of decline"
before the bank's current management took over: "The flow of
capital [had] reversed direction; people stopped upgrading their
homes; landlords stopped maintaining their apartment buildings;
[and] store owners stopped improving their businesses ....

"'

Essentially no bank would make loans in South Shore.4 6 In the
year before the current management took over, the bank had made
only two home loans in South Shore, and other banks had redlined
the area.
South Shore Bank's management began its redevelopment effort
by getting to know the South Shore neighborhood. They went to
neighborhood meetings, PTA meetings, block clubs, and churches,
and they made loans that other banks would have denied. This
investment in information paid off. The bank has had delinquency
rates below the national average and a return on assets above the
7
national average.
Recognizing that negative neighborhood externalities had
propelled South Shore's decline, the bank exploited the positive
neighborhood externalities created by its lending to get the most
value out of its loans. One of its primary lending strategies was to
make development loans for projects that enhanced one another.
As Mr. Grzywinski explains, "[t]here is synergy in neighborhoods.
Each building that gets improved improves the general economic

It is unclear how much credit the CRA deserves for the DVMP. The DVMP was
organized in 1977, before the CRA was enacted. The CRA has presumably
heightened members' interest in the DVMP, and to that extent the Act may be given
credit. For all of its virtues, however, the DVMP is expensive, which presumably
explains why it has not been replicated elsewhere. The question raised is whether
some other form of government intervention can promote more DVMPs or other
arrangements that enhance the efficiency of low-income neighborhood lending. The
fact that there is not a DVMP in every metropolitan area, however, suggests that the
CRA might be improved upon.
41 Grzywinski, supra note 37, at 89.
46 See id.
47 See id. at 96.
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environment and the quality of all the loans in the area."4 8 In one
project, South Shore coordinated financing for the renovation of
eleven apartment buildings in a four-block area. The bank's goal
was "to lift the standards, appearance, and self-confidence of an
entire disinvested neighborhood," in contrast to the "scattergun
approach" of lenders elsewhere.4 " Another South Shore practice
was to condition loans to apartment building owners on a borrower's commitment to renovate. The community as a whole and
South Shore Bank in particular benefited from this practice. As
Grzywinski points out, the bank's position as essentially the sole
lender in the neighborhood allowed it both to impose these
conditions on borrowers and to reap the benefits of the conditions
through the enhanced performance of its other loans."
The bank also reaped continuing informational benefits from its
relationships with borrowers. This information, consistent with
theory, fueled later successful lending. Grzywinski tells of "housing
entrepreneurs" whom the bank discovered by making certain
individuals their first loans to rehabilitate small housing units.
These initial loans allowed these individuals-and the bank-to
discover their talents. Once discovered, the bank continued to
finance their later renovation ventures. As Grzywinski states: "They
make up a body of small-business people that no market survey
could possibly have identified. They were invisible, and now they
51
are an industry-the core of South Shore."
The success of South Shore Bank is obviously a longer story, but
key ingredients included the management's intimate knowledge of
the neighborhood and its ability to capture positive neighborhood
52
and information externalities created by its lending.

48

49

Id. at 94.
Id. at 95.

5 See id. at 94.
51 Id. at 96.
52

1 South Shore Bank's entire business is presumably.so concentrated in contiguous
low-income neighborhoods that it need not worry about the CRA's mandate of widely
dispersed lending throughout its service area. A mainstream bank operating more
broadly in Chicago would not be able to specialize in this way. For an in-depth
description of South Shore Bank, see RICHARD P. TAUB, COMMUNITY CAPITALISM

(1994).
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In sum, the CRA does not reduce the information cost of
lending in low-income neighborhoods, nor does it internalize the
positive externalities created by such lending. Instead, the CRA
relies on command-and-control regulation to try to pry loans out of
reluctant banks and into low-income communities. This may be
unfortunate for both banks and residents of low-income communities. Whether it is or not depends on whether there is an alternative to the GRA that can achieve the same goals at a lower cost.
That possibility is addressed in Part III.
III. A MARKET-ORIENTED COMMUNITY INVESTMENT PROPOSAL:
TRADABLE OBLIGATIONS

As an alternative to the CRA, I propose a system of "tradable
CRA obligations" 3 analogous to the emissions trading programs
currently being implemented in the area of environmental regulation. This Part sets out the basic outlines of such an approach and
54
discusses its potential advantages over the current CRA regime.
A. The Proposal
The proposal has two basic elements. First, all banks would be
assigned an annual quota55 of CRA-qualified loans. Second, banks
would be given several options regarding how to meet this quota,
including the option of transferring it, or a portion of it, to another
lender.

" I use the acronym "CRA" because of its familiarity. This proposal would
probably not be authorized by the CRA; it would require new legislation.
' I originally proposed this system in a brief comment in the American Banker.

See Michael Klausner, Letting Banks Trade CRA Obligations Would Offer Market-Based
Efficiencies, AM. BANKER,Jan. 21, 1994, at 26. Following publication of that comment,
the proposal was endorsed by two economists at the Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco. See Neuberger & Schmidt, supra note 2, at 2-3.
5 I recognize that, if I were trying to sell this idea in the political marketplace, the
use of the term "quota" would be unwise. Nonetheless, the term expresses the
concept well, and the trading described below would eliminate much of the credit
allocation problem that would otherwise be associated with quotas.
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1. Definition of the CRA Obligation
The CRA quota, or obligation, would be defined objectively
and quantitatively. For instance, the annual volume of a bank's
obligation could be a specified percentage of its assets or deposits.
Qualifying loans would consist of loans to residents, businesses, and
projects in low-income neighborhoods. These neighborhoods would
be designated according to median incomes as is done under
current CRA regulations.5
A bank could earn CRA credit by either originating or holding
qualified loans. Each activity-originating and holding-would be
assigned a weighting. For instance, if a 50% weighting were applied
to originating a loan, the origination of $500,000 of qualified loans
would earn a bank $250,000 of credit. Likewise, if a 50% weighting
were applied to holding qualified loans, the holder of those loans
would earn the same amount of credit.5
If the originating bank
held its loans, that bank would earn the full $500,000 of credit. In
addition, certain types of loans that are especially costly to
make-perhaps multifamily housing construction loans and commercial loans, for example-might be given extra weightings in measuring credit toward a bank's CRA obligation.5" This is a detail,
See supra note 1.
"' Weightings for originating could differ from weightings for holding. For
instance, originating might be given a 60% weighting and holding a 40% weighting.
Because the CRA quota would be an annual obligation, credit for holding loans would
have to be measured in terms of changes over the prior year. In addition,
adjustments would have to be made to reflect loan durations in a bank's portfolio.
For example, a bank that has $1 million worth of one-year loans in its portfolio and
that replaces those loans with another $1 million of one-year loans in the next year
should probably be treated no differently from a bank that has $1 million worth of
two-year loans in its portfolio during the same period.
' Weightings would be related to the cost of a particular type of lending and any
external benefits that may exist. In 1993, the New York Banking Department
proposed new regulations that would quantify obligations under New York's
Community Reinvestment Act. That proposal included a complex weighting scheme.
For example, construction loans for multifamily housing units in low-income census
tracts were given a 50% higher weighting than mortgage loans to finance single family
home purchases in low-income neighborhoods. (A 3.0 weighting versus a 2.0
weighting.) See DERRICK D. CEPHAS, NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEP'T, CRA
56

PROPOSED REGULATIONS

14 (1993); see also Warren Traiger, ProposedChanges to New

York State CRA ComplianceandEnforcement Program,61 Banking Rep. (BNA) 651 (Oct.
25, 1993) (summarizing the use of quantitative weightings in the proposed CRA
regulations). The New York proposal did not involve any trading. Weightings would
certainly be imperfect measures of the cost of lending, but they could be adjusted
periodically.
A report by Federal Reserve staff members commented favorably on the New
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5
however, that does not warrant elaboration for present purposes.

9

2. Options for Discharging the CRA Obligation
Under this proposal, a bank would have several options by which
it could discharge its CRA obligation. The most straightforward
option for a bank would be to originate and hold the requisite
volume of loans. A second option would be to transfer the GRA
obligation, or a portion of it, to another lender for an agreed-upon
price. 6° This is the key element of the proposal.
To illustrate, assume that BankTwo must make $1,000,000 worth
of CRA-qualified loans this year and that the rules of the system
award a bank 50% credit for originating and 50% credit for holding
a qualified loan. Furthermore, assume that BankTwo has identified
$500,000 worth of qualified lending opportunities and that it both
originates those loans and holds them in its portfolio. BankTwo still

has $500,000 worth of CRA obligations to discharge. Countybank
and DownShore Bank, two specialists in CRA-lending, each offer to
accept BankTwo's remaining $500,000 worth of CRA obligation.
Countybank will take on the obligation in exchange for a payment

of $20,000, and DownShore will assume the obligation for $16,000.
Of the two, the DownShore offer is obviously more attractive.
BankTwo would therefore compare the payment of $16,000 with

York proposal, but expressed concern that the weighting system would in effect
transfer lending decision-making from banks to the government and thereby reduce
innovation. See Griffith L. Garwood & Delores S. Smith, The Community Reinvestment Act: Evolution and Current Issues, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 251, 264 (1993). These
effects would be mitigated by the trading that I propose. In addition, an advanceruling process, which I would allow and which the New York proposal allowed, could
facilitate innovation. The Federal Reserve report also recognized the benefit of
specifying CRA obligations in detail but explained that such specificity would reduce
flexibility. See id. at 253. Again, the trading regime proposed here would achieve
both specificity and flexibility.
" An alternative approach to giving credit for both originating and holding a loan
would be to give credit only for originating. Under that approach, originators might
still attempt to sell their loans, and a market-clearing price would presumably exist.
It would be lower than it would be if the CRA credit were given for holding a
qualified loan. That lower price would then be reflected in a higher price that
originators would demand to take on another bank's CRA obligation. See infra part
III.A.2.
' The transferee could be a bank or another type of lending institution, such as
a savings and loan or a credit union. For a description of the many types of
community-development lenders, see PARZEN & KIESCHNICK, supranote 20, at 101-06.
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its expected cost of fulfilling the remaining quota itself. If its
expected cost is greater than $16,000, it will accept DownShore's
offer and transfer its remaining obligation of $500,000 worth of
CRA-qualified lending to DownShore. DownShore will then have to
meet its own CRA obligation plus $500,000 worth of BankTwo's
obligation." Once DownShore has accepted BankTwo's obligation,
6 2
BankTwo will have discharged its CRA obligation for the year.
Under this proposal, a bank would have several options short of
transferring its obligation. It could originate loans and sell them to
third parties; it could originate no loans and instead buy loans from
other lenders 63 (in the form of whole loans, participations, or
securitized loans); or it could lend through a consortium.6 4 The
following examples illustrate some of the ways in which a bank
could use these alternatives to discharge a $1,000,000 CRA
obligation, again assuming 50% weightings for originating and
holding loans. If this system were actually implemented, other
structures and vehicles would presumably be developed as well.
First, a bank could originate $2,000,000 worth of home loans in lowincome neighborhoods and transfer those loans to a pool (perhaps
assembled by another institution) from which securitized passthrough certificates would be sold to third parties. Second, it could
buy $2,000,000 worth of pass-through certificates representing
interests in such a pool. Third, it could invest $2,000,000 in a
consortium that lends in low-income neighborhoods. Fourth, it
could buy a $2,000,000 million participation in a large loan
originated by another bank for the construction of multifamily lowincome housing. In each of these examples, the bank would either
originate or hold $2,000,000 worth of loans and would therefore
earn $1,000,000 worth of CRA credit-50% of the face amount of
the loans.

61 DownShore has presumably determined that with the $16,000 payment from
BankTwo it can make money lending $500,000 in CRA-qualified loans.
6' The details of the trading process would develop over time. Brokers might
emerge, auctions might be held, or parties might contact one another directly.
' The lender from which a loan is purchased might be a bank or another type of

lender.

" If a consortium were structured as ajointly held pool, a bank would earn pro
rata credit for loans that the consortium originates or holds. The weighting of this
pro rata share is a detail that would have to be worked out.
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3. Geographical Constraints on Originating,
Holding, and Trading

Two related issues that would have to be resolved in implementing this proposal are, first, the extent to which a bank's CRA
obligation would be tied to its area of operation and, second, how
that area would be defined. If a bank's CRA obligation were tied to
its service area as it is under current law, and if the obligation were
defined as a percentage of the bank's assets, the distribution of
loans would mirror the distribution of bank assets across service
areas, which would raise certain problems. There may be no
relationship between bank assets in an area and creditworthy
lending opportunities in that area's low-income neighborhoods.
Consequently, low-income neighborhoods with many large banks
nearby might receive too much credit, and those with few banks
might receive too little. This is a potential problem under the
current regime as well. It is mitigated only by the regulators'
discretion to take lending opportunities into account when assigning
CRA ratings." Additionally, if obligations were tied to a bank's
service area, there might be too few lenders with which to trade
CRA obligations or to which to sell CRA-qualified loans. As a
result, there might be insufficient liquidity in the CRA trading
market.
On the other hand, if CRA lending obligations could be freely
transferred out of an area, the availability of credit to any particular
low-income neighborhood could become volatile, which could mean
temporary interruptions in the availability of credit." As discussed
above, the absence of positive information and neighborhood externalities could transform such temporary shortages of credit into a
spiral of illiquidity and deterioration not warranted by underlying
economic forces.6
Therefore, there may be efficiency reasons to

65 See

supra text accompanying notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
' Ordinarily, more trading in a market would be associated with more liquidity.
In this case, however, banks would be forced to lend in their own service areas if they
could not trade. Thus, if no trading could occur across service areas, each area would
receive a volume of loans equal to the sum of its banks' quotas. In contrast, if trading
were not constrained to a bank's service area, some areas would get more than that
amount, some would get less, and the volume of lending in any given area would
fluctuate.
6 See supra part I.A.2. This is
analogous to the "hot spot" problem in emissions
trading, whereby trading can result in the geographic concentration of pollution. See
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The
Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 187-88 (1988);
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tie at least a portion of a bank's CRA obligation to a relatively
localized geographical area and to allow a bank to satisfy the
remainder of its obligation in any low-income neighborhood in the
68
country.
The issue of geographical constraints on trading is closely
related to the issue of how to define a bank's service area for
purposes of this trading regime. The current system, in which each
bank defines its own "assessment areas" subject to review by its
regulator,6 9 would be unworkable. Every bank would want to maximize the number of its potential trading partners. Consequently,
each bank would seek the largest trading area possible. A better
approach would be to authorize the regulators to define trading
areas. These trading areas could be states, local or regional banking
markets, or any other geographical areas, so long as they are well
defined and include enough lenders to ensure liquidity in trading
CRA obligations and in the buying and selling of CRA-qualified
loans. Trading areas might also be drawn to try to allocate lowincome areas as evenly as possible.7" In addition, to mitigate
problems in defining borders, banks near borders could be allowed
to choose which trading group to join.
B. The Economics of Information and Collective Action
Under a Tradable Obligation System
The CRA is essentially a regulatory tax on banks, the proceeds
of which are used to subsidize lending in low-income neighborhoods." The tradable obligation system proposed here constitutes

Richard L. Cohen, Note, EnvironmentalLessons for the Development of a Market-Based
Community Reinvestment Act System, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. LJ. (forthcoming 1995). In this
context, "cold spot" might appropriately describe areas that lack credit. The response
in the pollution context is to constrain trading to avoid concentration. In the CRA
context, tying at least a portion of a bank's CRA obligation to the bank's community
might be similarly appropriate.
" There would still be a problem for banks with too few low-income neighborhoods in their service area.
69 See, e.g., Final Regulations, supra note 1 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 228.42).
70 Unevenness could also be remedied by assigning lower quotas to banks in
trading areas with fewer low-income neighborhoods. Alternatively, banks in areas
with relatively few low-income neighborhoods could be permitted to trade a larger
portion of their obligations to banks in other areas.
71 The tax is not equal to the volume of lending to low-income neighborhoods.
Most of those loans are repaid. The tax is the difference between the return on those
loans and their cost, including search costs, monitoring costs, other administrative
costs, and the cost of defaults.
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a similar tax and subsidy. Although there are many details to be
worked out and the practicality of the proposal would have to be
considered further, this system can potentially produce more
benefits for targeted communities per dollar of tax than does the
CRA. Its advantages stem largely from the promotion of information efficiencies and the internalization of externalities. Other
advantages may be present as well.
1. Specialization and Information Costs
In contrast to the current CRA regime, a system of tradable
obligations would promote specialization. 72 Banks and other
lenders would have incentives to develop expertise in lending in
low-income neighborhoods. Those that succeed in developing that
expertise could, in effect, sell their services to other banks.
Through competition, the most efficient CRA lenders would emerge
to serve CRA-targeted neighborhoods. Those lenders, which could
range from small community-based lenders to community-oriented
units within money center banks, would have incentives to gather
information most economically and to use that information to make
loans to creditworthy borrowers in low-income neighborhoods. This
efficiency would be reflected in lower costs of screening and
monitoring borrowers and lower loan losses. Less efficient lenders
would pursue other lines of business while either paying a specialist
to take over their CRA obligations or buying or participating in
loans that specialists originate. As a result, information costs would
be minimized.
The parallel to the pollution context is instructive. Under
emissions trading systems, polluters are given rights to emit
specified quantities of pollution. If a polluter can become sufficiently efficient to emit less than its quota, it can sell its unused
rights to another polluter for cash. On the other hand, if a polluter
wants to emit more than its quota, it must buy the unused rights of
another polluter. Under this system, polluters have incentives to
develop technologies and processes that produce high output for
each unit of pollution emitted.78 Under the proposal outlined
above, lenders would have similar financial incentives. Some banks

For a discussion of the benefits of specialization, see supra part II.A.
7 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 67, at 179; Robert W. Hahn & Gordon L.
Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theori and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361
(1989). See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, ReformingEnvironmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985).

1995]

MARKET FAILURE AND COMMUNITY INVESTMENT

1587

would attempt to become efficient lenders in low-income neighborhoods. By doing so, they would be able to take on other banks'
CRA obligations at prices that are lower than the cost those banks
would incur in making CRA-qualified loans themselves. Other
banks-those that choose not to or that are unable to specialize in
CRA-qualified lending-would impose a market discipline on these
specialists by transferring their obligations to the lowest bidder and
by making CRA-qualified loans themselves when opportunities arise
that are less costly than paying another lender to take on their
74
obligations.
This proposal would also separate the function of originating
loans from that of holding loans, further promoting the development of specialized expertise. 5 It is well recognized that originating and holding loans are distinct banking services. 6 Institutions
that are successful at originating loans may not be successful at
managing loan portfolios. Indeed, the separation of these functions
has fueled a massive market in securitized loans. 77 A system of
tradable obligations would allow low-income borrowers to reap the
benefit of a similar separation. For example, small communitybased lenders seem well suited to identify creditworthy borrowers
and to monitor and educate those borrowers.7 ' These institutions,
however, may be poor portfolio managers and might do well to sell
off large portions of their loans, just as banks, savings and loans,
and mortgage bankers currently do with mainstream home loans,
auto loans, and credit card receivables. By selling loans that they
originate, low-income neighborhood lending specialists would be

71 See Cohen, supra note 67 (applying experience with emissions trading to this
proposals). Although I have described the market system in terms of specialists
acquiring other banks' CRA obligations, the ability ofspecialists to sell loans that they
originate-either in securitized form, as whole loans, or as participations-further
contributes to the market process. Lenders that make good loans at low cost will
make the greatest profit from selling those loans.
' The trading of obligations is not needed to obtain this benefit. If the current
CRA allowed full credit for holding loans that a bank does not originate, this
separation
of function could occur.
76
See, e.g.,JAMES A. ROSENTHAL &JUAN M. OCAMPO, SECURITIZATION OF CREDIT

13-14 (1988).
7 See 1 TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION § 1.3 (1991); Joseph. C. Shenker &
Anthony Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New Frontiers,69
TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1991).
7' See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. This is not to say that large
institutions will not be efficient CRA lenders as well. Under this system, market
forces would sort out the efficient and inefficient lenders to low-income neighborhoods.
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able to focus their attention on their strength, which is originating
loans. Moreover, they would gain access to funds to support their
origination business. Their loan volume would no longer be limited
by their deposit base.79 In addition, by selling loans and investing
some of their funds in other financial assets, these specialists could
diversify their portfolios, while still concentrating on geographically
undiversified origination of loans. In short, this proposal would not
only allow banks to specialize in originating loans in low-income
neighborhoods, it would also provide those banks with a ready
80
source of new funding.
In sum, under a tradable obligation regime, competition would
promote information efficiencies that are lacking under the current
CRA regime. Consequently, more lending would occur in lowincome neighborhoods for each dollar of regulatory tax imposed on
banks.
2. Internalization of Externalities
This system of tradable obligations would also promote the
internalization of positive information and neighborhood
externalities. It would do so by promoting the formation of a
relatively small number of lenders with a continuing interest in
particular low-income neighborhoods and by channeling large
volumes of loans through those lenders. This too would result in
more lending per dollar of regulatory tax.
By accepting other banks' obligations and by originating loans
that other banks will ultimately hold, a single bank operating under
this system could originate a high volume of loans throughout a lowincome neighborhood. Because of its large market share in a
neighborhood, such a bank could expect to reap significant portions
of the positive information and neighborhood externalities that its
lending produces. The ability to reap information externalities
would directly reduce its cost of lending. The ability to reap
neighborhood externalities would lead a bank to target loans, as

79 See ROSENTHAL & OCAMPO, supra note 76, at 228 (stating that community banks
are good originators and would benefit by being able to securitize the loans they
originate). Banks would develop securitization structures that give loan originators

incentives to lend to creditworthy borrowers and to price loans correctly. In addition,

reputational interests would promote such lending practices.
' As discussed in note 59, it may not be necessary to provide credit for holding
CRA-qualified loans. This separation of function might occur naturally by giving
credit for origination alone. Originators would still have incentives to find markets
for their loans.
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South Shore Bank did," in a manner that limits the impact of
negative neighborhood externalities and that enhances synergies in
positive neighborhood externalities. This would enhance the value
of lending opportunities.
In addition, with a smaller number of banks involved in a
neighborhood, banks could coordinate with one another to
accomplish these results.
By internalizing neighborhood
externalities banks would produce more value per dollar lent than
if they engaged in untargeted and uncoordinated lending. As a
result, they would be able to make more loans per dollar of
regulatory tax than they can under the CRA.
3. Allocation of Loans
Under the CRA, the allocation of lending in low-income
neighborhoods is heavily influenced by the decisions of regulators.
Thejudgment of bank examiners, and bankers' anticipation of those
judgments, are primary mechanisms that link the quantity and
location of a bank's lending to the availability of lending opportunities in low-income neighborhoods. Regulators'judgments, however,
are unlikely to produce an efficient allocation of the CRA's benefits.
Lending decisions entail too much detailed information regarding
too many borrowers and potential borrowers for a bank examiner
to assimilate. Indeed, dissatisfaction with reliance on regulatory
discretion lies at the heart of today's widespread dissatisfaction with
the CRA. Banks have incurred high costs in attempting to inform
and influence regulators, and residents of low-income neighborhoods have reported that creditworthy borrowers remain unserved. 2 This dissatisfaction led to the recent promulgation of the
new, more results-oriented CRA regulations.8 3 But to the extent
that these regulations increase pressure on banks to make loans,
84
there is a danger that banks will be induced to make bad loans.
The only protection against this risk is the regulations' continued
reliance on regulatory discretion to take into account the profitable
See supra text accompanying notes 45-52.
1 See Macey & Miller, supra note 4, at 326-30. For another proposal that reduces
discretion, see Swire,supranote 5, at 351-53 (proposing an administrative safe harbor
provision that banks could qualify for by making appropriate investments in CRA
activities).
a See supra text accompanying note 10.
a Quantified (untradable) obligations would create the same problem on an even
greater scale.
81
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lending opportunities available to a bank in assigning it a CRA
rating.85
Rather than regulatory discretion, a tradable obligation system
would rely on market forces to allocate loans in low-income
neighborhoods. As in other markets, creditworthy borrowers and
profit-seeking lenders would have incentives to find one another.
The pursuit of profits would lead a community-based lender in a
particular neighborhood to seek out the most creditworthy
borrowers in its neighborhood and to help people and businesses
become more creditworthy borrowers. Moreover, the pursuit of
profits would lead community entrepreneurs to establish banks in
neighborhoods that offer unmet lending opportunities.
A further problem with allocating loans under the current CRA
is that banks can limit their obligations by selecting locations that
have few low-income neighborhoods nearby. At the margin, the
CRA drives banks away from low-income neighborhoods. 86 In
contrast, the system proposed here would drive banks into those
neighborhoods. The size of a bank's obligation would not be
affected by its location. Moreover, banks with the appropriate
expertise would enter low-income neighborhoods because they
could make profits by doing so, and the absence of lenders serving
a neighborhood would constitute a business opportunity.
4. Enforcement and Compliance Costs
Enforcement and compliance costs would also be lower under
this system than under the current system. There would be no
uncertainty in the definition of CRA obligations. Consequently,
there would be no need for the onerous paperwork associated with
the CRA.87 Nor would banks have to make loans in anticipation of
an examiner's subjective review. Indeed, the CRA examination
process could be bypassed. Bank examiners would not have to pore
over bank records attempting to determine whether a bank has met
the "credit needs" of its community. Once the quotas are defined,
the primary role of the regulator would be to ensure that they are
8
fulfilled and to enforce contracts to transfer those obligations.'
8 See supra note 32.
8 See Macey & Miller, supra note

4, at 340-41.
s7 See id. at 324-33.
s A difficult enforcement problem would be the situation in which a bank takes
on the obligation of another bank and then fails to fulfill the obligation. One answer
is to impose a penalty on the transferee to deter such an abuse. To the extent that
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Banks could simply file reports stating how they discharged their
own CRA obligations and those that they accepted from other
banks. Spot-checks, combined with penalties for misreporting,
8 9
could be used to promote compliance.
5. Measure of Social Cost
Finally, the system proposed here would provide valuable
information regarding the social cost of forcing banks to lend in
low-income neighborhoods. The prices at which CRA obligations
trade would be a measure of that cost. Those prices could inform
adjustments in the size of CRA quotas or the delineation of trading
areas. If prices are deemed to be too high in a trading area,
reflecting either a shortage of creditworthy borrowers or the high
costs of finding them, quotas might be reduced, the trading area
might be redefined, or other forms of intervention might be considered. Under the current regime, we have no measure of the extent
to which profitable lending opportunities exist in low-income neighborhoods. The absence of this information inevitably confuses the
debate over whether banks provide too little or too much credit in
low-income neighborhoods.
C.

Caveats and Qualifications

The tradable obligation system proposed here would impose
costs on banks, just as the current CRA does. I have argued that
this system potentially offers more benefits to targeted beneficiaries
per dollar of cost than does the current CRA.9" This justification,
however, would only be available up to a point. Above some level,
a quota would not produce efficiency gains. It would merely redistribute wealth to residents of low-income neighborhoods. Moreover, if quotas were too high, inefficiency could result because

enforcement is imperfect, however, there may also be a need to penalize the
transferor in extreme cases-for example, those in which the transferor knows or has
reason to know that the transferee is not acting in good faith. In general, however,
transferors would need to be given assurance that their transfers are final.
9 This system thus has the compliance benefits of a system based on objective,
qualified obligations without the rigidity that can lead to bad loans.
0 The tradable obligation system may also increase social wealth in comparison
to a regime of nonintervention by imposing costs on banks that are lower than the
benefits conferred on the residents of low-income neighborhoods. The net increase
in aggregate wealth would be attributable to the reduction in information costs and
the internalization of externalities.
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banks might not be able to compete with financial institutions not
subject to this regulatory tax.
The current CRA raises the possibility of such inefficiency as
well. Under that system the regulatory tax is set by the low-visibility,
decentralized decisions of presumably apolitical bank examiners. In
contrast, under the tradable obligation system proposed here, the
size of the quota would be highly visible and subject to political
influence. This political problem may well be a fatal flaw of this
proposal. It is the counterpart of the regulatory uncertainty and
imprecision that make the current CRA problematic. Community
advocates and banks specializing in serving low-income neighborhoods would fight for high quotas, mainstream banks would fight
for low quotas, and there is no reason to expect the quota to be set
just right. Nonetheless, the visibility of the prices at which the CRA
obligations would trade under this system might blunt the impact of
these political forces. As stated above, these prices reflect the social
cost of intervening in these markets. Once revealed, perhaps the
cost of intervention would at least inform the politics of intervention.
A second troubling aspect of this proposal is the fact that it, like
the current CRA, forces bank shareholders to bear the cost of
intervention. As stated at the outset, I have taken this political
reality as my starting point, without attempting to justify it.
Nonetheless, the imposition of these costs warrants justification.
Consideration might be devoted to spreading the costs more widely,
perhaps all the way to the taxpayer, by providing banks with
compensating tax benefits or other transfers. Consideration might
also be given to spreading the cost to banks' competitors, which
would reduce the competitive disadvantage that banks currently
suffer under the CRA. One incidental benefit of a tradable
obligation system is the relative ease with which it could be applied
to nonbank financial institutions.
CONCLUSION

The information costs and externalities discussed in Part I, may
justify government intervention in low-income neighborhood credit
markets. Further research is needed before we can accept this
conclusion with confidence. The CRA, however, has attracted
detractors on all sides, and appears to be poorly suited to responding to these market imperfections. Other alternatives are therefore
worth considering. The system of tradable obligations proposed
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here is one possibility. In comparison to the CRA, it offers a
reasonable response to these market imperfections, and it offers
other attractions as well. As emphasized throughout this discussion,
however, there are details to be worked out and potential problems
to consider further. At this point, my only claim is that in light of
the stakes, for both banks and low-income communities, this
proposal is worth considering.

